The social context of an agent can have a profound influence upon their decisions and actions, where their attitudes and ideologies frequently change the interpretation given to a specific body of knowledge. However, attitudes and ideologies themselves result from groups of agents as they communicate and respond to information. This paper proposes a geometric model of an agent in context, where human attitudes among multiple agents are seen to self-organise to fo form ideologies, which then serve to guide further agent attitude changes.
The Challenges of Modelling Social Systems
How are we to model human social interactions and the resulting largely man-made systems that are somewhat paradoxically beyond the reach of human control? The sheer complexity of social systems has historically left them beyond the reach of analytical descriptions and numerical simulations, however, recent decades have seen a shift towards this next great frontier of analysis. With an ever growing supply of social data, increasing computational power, and a far more sophisticated understanding of human cognitive processing, sophisticated computational models of social systems are fast becoming feasable. The importance of this frontier is also increasingly apparent; as our species grapples with wicked problems such as climate change, the global financial crisis, and the forcasted age of scarcity, which all have an inherently social theme, we must find appropriate models and methods that can integrate with existing physical, financial and biological approaches. This integration must happen in both directions however, and those attempting computational simulations of social systems must pay attention to the lessons that have already been learned in fields such as psychology and sociology.
Social psychology [4] focuses on social actions and interrelations. It looks at the way in which personality, values, and cognitive states affect and are affected by social structure and culture. As such, it provides the perfect starting place for complex systems scientists to enter the frontier of social modelling. For example, consider the challenges facing policy makers as they attempt to adapt to and mitigate for the effects of climate change. While it is essential that we have sound models of the bio-physical processes underlying this phenomenon, it is equally important that we understand how humans will respond to the information presented by climate models, to policy inititives, to media campaigns and to word of mouth. A set of climate models that somehow incorporated the opinions and attitudes, and hence likely decisions and actions of humans would significantly aid policy makers as they attempt to guide our society through a period of intense change and readjustment. Thus, while it is essential that we understand the physical processes underlying climate change, we ignore the attitudes and opinions of the world population at our peril.
This paper introduces a mathematically oriented model of attitude change which takes some results from social psychology as its starting point. Section 2 introduces the notion of attitudes, and attitude change, and so traces out the scope of effects that computational models must navigate before they can be considered as psychologically plausible. In particular, we shall emphasise the manner in which a social context can drive the behaviour of human agents. We then introduce a geometric approach in section 3, which is capable of capturing many of the key aspects of this socially adaptive behaviour. In particular, we shall claim that this model is capable of exhibiting behaviour typical of Guided Self-Organization (GSO), showing how groups of agents can be guided by the information presented to them, which is in turn the result of a self-organizing process that arises between the agents themselves. We will finish with a discussion of the manner such an approach opens up the paradigm of social modelling in a novel direction.
Attitude Changes and the Social Context of an Agent
Social psychology defines attitudes as refering to a person's overall evaluation of people (including themselves), objects and issues [25] . Even when writing the first Handbook of Social Psychology in 1935, Allport claimed that the attitude construct was the most indispensible concept in the field [2] . Attitudes play a critical role in the choices people make regarding their own health and security as well as those of their families, friends, and nations. From purchase decisions provoked by liking for a product to wars spurned by ethnic prejudices, attitudes help to determine a wide variety of potentially consequential outcomes. [25] However, this very potentiality of attitudes makes them extremely difficult to model. How will a given person think about 'global warming' vs 'climate change' ? What if their daughter has just had her house flooded? Or if they are about to make a very large tax payment that includes a carbon component? People's attitudes are not static immutable objects, but change in response to persuasion [28] , and the attempt to maintain cognitive consistency [12] . We often express different attitudes and opinions in accordance with the social scenario we find ourselves in [3, 5] , and it is frequently the case that an explicitly expressed attitude is quite different from an internally held one [17] .
The very complexity of attitudes makes attitude change extremely difficult to model. The review article by Petty & Wegener [25] provides an overview of the experimental work that has sought to understand this process. Indeed, while an extensive empirical collection of results had been published by the 1970's little conceptual coherence had been established. Frequently, the same variable (e.g., source credibility or mood) would have a different effect in different scenarios, and could sometimes even produce the same persuasion outcome via different processes in different situations [25] . Two proposals then arose in the late 1970's which started to unify the diverse behaviour exhibited by humans; the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) [24] ; and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) [11] . Both of these models utilise a dual-process approach that takes a form of mental effort as its key switching variable.
a Thus, the many early models that had been initially proposed to explain the varying empirial results were unified; they were not competing or contradictory but operated in different circumstances. Thus some processes of attitude change require relatively high amounts of mental effort, resulting from situations where individuals are motivated to pay attention to a message, or have the cognitive capacities to consider it carefully. In these high effort or high elaboration processes, people's attitudes will be determined by an effortful examination of all relevant information, and so changing them will expend high amounts of cognitive energy. In contrast, other processes of persuasion require relatively little mental effort on the part of the persuadee, resulting in attitudes that are determined by factors like emotions, 'gut feeling', liking, and reference to authority. Similar amounts of attitude change can be produced via either process, however, the changes induced by the high mental effort processes are postulated to be more persistent, resistant to counterpersuasion, and predictive of behavior than low effort attitude changes. The difference between these two processes has a number of implications for public policy. In an era of high-frequency press reporting periods (i.e. the 24 hour news a Despite a slight difference in emphasis (the ELM high effort route arises from the cognitive processing of a message, whereas the HSM emphasises the "effort exerted in comprehending message content, not effort exerted in cognitive responding or thinking about message content" [14] ), both models are highly similar, and they can generally accomodate the same empirical results. cycle) we have entered a climate where low effort attitudes appear to predominate [27, 31] , and the transitional nature of this process could be seen to result in the apparent increase in undecided or swinging voters in the modern age. This in turn has led to dramatic shifts in public opinion about issues such as climate change, immigration etc. that often catch policy makers by surprise; how are they to predict, or perhaps even to guide such changes in public attitude? There are few models capable of describing the dynamics of this process, a significant lack that we propose to address in this article.
One possible approach would be to implement models such as the ELM or the HSM computationally. However, from the perspective of computational models, and Agent Based Modelling (ABM) approaches in particular, a key weakness of these two models is their largely heuristic nature. Indeed, Mosler et. al introduced a computational simulation of the ELM, emphasising the advantage of simulations for the purpose of theory formalization, due to their requirement for complete specification of variables, relation types etc. [23] . This same approach has since been used to model social phenomena such as environmental campaigns [22] and so provides a very interesting first step in this direction. However, we see a potential problem with this approach [22] to the modelling of the ELM modules which is highly deterministic. While there are many variables working together in this model, leading to nonlinear effects and indeterminacies that are hard to predict, there is no uncertainty in the model itself; an agent will always respond in the same manner to a situation that is identical. Although Mosler & Martens do recognise this determinism as a weakness and intend to implement random generators that drive individual behaviour with a well defined variance [22] , this in itself raises an interesting question as to what kind of uncertainty is appropriate in a social simulation.
The uncertainty underlying the proposed extended approach of Mosler & Martens is one that arises from a lack of knowledge on the part of the modeller. The new agents would have a well defined but epistemologically unknowable state; as modellers we "know too little" [8] about that state and this is the cause of the uncertainty most commonly incorporated into models of the system. However, people are frequently genuinely undecided about issues and courses of action to follow; they have yet to make up their minds and so their state is in some sense undefined. Philosophically, this difference is quite profound. An agent who has already formed an attitude towards a social issue (which we admittedly might not know about) may exhibit very different behaviour from one who has not considered their response to that same issue. Indeed, the second agent may, from a given initial state, repond very differently to a question, survey, piece of information etc. depending upon how it is framed [33, 8, 34, 9] . This contextuality of a social agent is not something that is well treated by current computational approaches, and it is the aim of the coming discussion to present a model that will be able to treat such scenarios. First however, an example will help to clarify the concepts just dicussed, and will serve to illustrate the coming discussion.
Let us consider an agent, who, from a particular cognitive state must decide whether or not to act in some way. They might be answering a a question, they might be voting for a particular politician, perhaps they need to work out if they should immunise their child, or drive to work. In order to maintain generality in the model that follows we shall term all of these different decisions as actions. However, the agent has not yet made their decision, and how they eventually do choose to act will depend upon both their own attitudes (implicit and explicit), and on the attitudes of those that surround them. Thus, an extra set of factors will affect the agent, and henceforth these will be referred to as the context of the agent. Note that an agent with the same initial cognitive state may choose a different course of action if they find themselves in a different context, and this uncertainty should lie in the mind of the agent. However, seating uncertainty in the mind of the agent implies that even if the same agent is presented with the same context then they might choose something different, a situation that we feel relects the true uncertainty of human decision making (and its modelling). Finally, we note also the recursiveness of attitudes; the actions of our agent will feed back into the context of other agents in the system, so changing the context of their decisions.
We shall now attempt to incorporate this behaviour in a simple geometric model of an agent in context.
A Simple Model of an Agent in Context
How shall we represent an agent A, in a changing social context? How will the attitudes and decisions of the agent in turn feed back into and affect that context? The discussion of the previous section has introduced us to the notion of contextuality and how it affects both attitude formation and thus the resulting actions of an agent. A model of decision making in a social context must incorporate such effects in a manner that is psychologically plausible.
We shall begin with a consideration of the cognitive state of our agent, represented as |A , which A may not have direct access to (i.e. A may not be aware of this state for reasons of context to be explained below). If A has decided to act then we shall denote this state of action using the symbol |1 , to represent a situation where it is true that they have chosen to act (in contrast to a state of inaction which we denote as |0 ). However, a decision to act (or not) depends on the context in which it is made; we are immediately faced with the dilemma that our social agent cannot be described as making a decision without reference to a context. Thus, we must specify that within a given context, termed p say, our agent will have a certain probability of acting, and note that a change in context might change this probability.
In what follows, we propose that a geometric model of an agent in a changeable context provides the minimal model required to demonstrate many of the phenomena exhibited by human agents in the social world. This model takes inspiration from quantum theory (QT), which has a probability structure that is markedly different from that of classical probablity theory [19] . For example, classical probability theory generally assumes that a system has some specified state which measurements then ascertain (with uncertainty arising due to a lack of knowledge). In contrast, it appears that much of the uncertainty involved in social modelling is of a different form; it is ontological rather than epistemological, which means that very different responses can be obtained from the same agent if they are asked the same question in a different way, or even in the same way. QT provides a very natural formalism for describing such a state of affairs, indeed, quantum systems behave in a markedly similar manner, and this is the motivation underlying the geometric nature of the model to be proposed shortly. Geometry provides a very natural way of incorporating the importance of context into the representation of the current state of a agent, via the Pythagoras' theorem. In what follows, we shall represent both the current state of an agent, and that of their context explicitly. This is done by expanding the notion of a state from that of a point in a space, to that of a vector in a Hilbert space, which is a real or complex inner product space that is also a complete metric space with respect to the distance function induced by the inner product [19] . At this point we can start to ask what the state of our undecided agent might be. Requiring that they have a probability of acting in any way whatsoever that is equal to 1 (as is standard), then there is one obvious choice for the representation of the current state of our agent, |A , in some context p:
a situation that is illustrated in Figure 1 (a). Here, {|0 p , |1 p } are taken to define an orthonormal basis, the inner product (denoted in the quantum formalism as .|. ) of which returns 0 or 1:
Thus, we have used the orthonormal basis {|0 p , |1 p } to represent the set of 'act' or 'not act' decisions to be made by our agent in the context p. We note that in this case orthogonality is entirely appropriate as an agent cannot do both, however, before they make their decision, the agent can be genuinely undecided; in a different context their probability of choosing an action may change quite significantly. In order to make this point clear, we must now define a notion of measurement. When a person responds to a survey they are undergoing a measurement, and the same can be said of all actions as they were defined above. The decision to act (or not) entails the measurement of a state of an agent, but this very act of measurement may itself affect the decision to act. For example, consider the manner in which the framing of a decision in a positive or negative light can lead to risk averse or risk taking behaviour [33] . Such results suggest that the act of measurement can itself influence the outcomes that are obtained, but the geometric formulation can easily incorporate such effects.
Measurement of the state (1) is defined in this approach with respect to a projection operator V , where
Thus, the basis vectors {|0 p , |1 p } define the current context p of our agent, which in turn affects their decisions about whether or not to perform an action during the process of measurement. This effect is reflected in the probability of our agent acting in a given context p is given by
and similarly, their probability of inaction is given by |a 0 | 2 . Perhaps the most important feature of this new model arises from a consideration of context itself; it is not just a label. We can immediately develop a far richer notion of context by asking: what would happen if the context changed? QT provides us with a particularly elegant mechanism for dealing with this scenario via a change of basis. Consider figure 1(b), which is an elaboration of figure 1(a), and represents the changing probabilities of action that arise in the case of two different contexts, p and q. With reference to figure 1(b) we can quickly see that while our agent is highly likely to act in context q, this is not the case in context p, where A is much less likely to act (since by examination of the figure we can see that while
We shall now extend this simple model to the description of a society of agents, each making decisions to act (or not) within a social context.
A Multi-Agent Model
This simple model can be naturally extended across a set of multiple agents which we shall call a society. In Figure 2 we have drawn a collection of agents, {|A , |B , |C . . . }, where each individual x is described with a current state |x that is expected to change in time. Each agent is attempting to make a decision within some set of social contexts, and these are represented by the bases (or axes) that surround each agent. Two potential social contexts (blue {|0 b , |1 b } and red {|0 r , |1 r }) have been drawn in this figure, and a simple geometric application of the Pythagorean theorem shows the manner in which the probability of each agent's decision to act can substantially change with reference to a different social context. Figure 2 has depicted agents |A and |B with very similar states, while agent |C appears to have a difference in opinion. As the probabilities of action for these three different agents are extracted by taking a projection of their state onto an axis labelled with at |1 , this simple example shows a marked difference between the probable actions of the three agents in the illustrated social contexts. Thus, while |C is unlikely to act in either context, |A is slightly more likely to act than not in the blue frame, and |B shows a strong propensity to act in the blue frame.
While this simple model does appear to be intuitively plausible, we have yet to discuss the manner in which a frame (or context) comes to exist, or how it might change in time. While it must be accepted that the notion of context is a quite contentious and poorly defined one [1, 7, 10, 18, 21] , we think that something of value can be added to the notion of context through the consideration of the context of an agent as it is defined with reference to the other agents in the system.
A Principle of Information Load Minimisation
As was discussed in section 2 the widely accepted social models of attitude change (ELM and HSM) both take a dual approach, using a notion of mental effort to define the switch between the processes that drive attitude change in different scenarios. Thus, high effort processes arise when people consider incoming information in a high-involvement and high-effort systematic way, and low-effort processing occurs when people are not motivated, or incapable of paying attention to incoming information. The approach presented above in section 3 provides an opportunity to model this second (low effort), process nontrivially, as it provides an explicit recognition of the context in which an agent is making a decision. While existing computational approaches model agent responses to low-effort information as a set of determinate variables which change according to a set of predefined rules [22] , the current approach is far more fundamentally stochastic. This is because the geometric model allows for the probability of an agent acting to vary over the full range (0, 1) in response to the range of angles (0
• , 360 • ) that an agent's state can make with respect to the frame within which they are currently considering their decision. Two key factors will be taken to form the basis of A's decision to act or not:
(1) the current state of the agent, |A , which from this point on will be considered as a representation of their current attitudes. (2) The social context p of the agent A.
Since the social context of an agent will be affected by the current attitudes of every agent in the system, we quickly see that these two factors will recursively interact through time. We also note that agents will change their state as a result of their choices, in a manner that will be specified in section 6. First however, this section will introduce a key principle that will feature in driving the time dynamics of this system of social agents.
Returning to the equation representing the state of our agent that was introduced in equation (1), we start with a consideration of the uncertainty that an agent experiences. An agent who has decided to act has reduced their uncertainty about a situation, as has one who has decided not to act. In contrast, an agent who is most undecided (i.e. has a current state that forms a 45
• angle between choosing to act and choosing not to act in the context p) is highly uncertain about their future action in that context, and this is not a state that people tend to enjoy. Indeed, there is a history of literature in psychology suggesting that people preferentially tend to not to make decisions in situations of uncertainty [29, 34] .
This leads us to introduce a minimisation principle which takes as its basis the desire of people to be 'decided'. This principle assumes that people tend not to enjoy living in states of uncertainty, and that they will preferentially seek a state in which they can maximise their chances of being decided about an action. In order to model this behaviour we require a measure of the uncertainty that an agent experiences in their current context. Binary entropy provides a suitable measure for of this uncertainty. Defined as the entropy of a Bernoulli trial (e.g. a two-outcome random variable such as a coin toss), with a probability of success given by P , it is specified as:
which is the concave function depicted in figure 3 that takes its minimum values at P = 0 and P = 1, and its maximum at P = 1/2. An agent who is uncomfortable with uncertainty will seek to minimise the binary entropy associated with their current attitude over time by aligning their state with the context in which they are currently making a decision to act. Thus, we formulate the following principle: Principle 1. Agents seek to minimise the binary entropy associated with their current state or attitude, in whatever frame is currently relevant to the agent.
Thus, the time evolution of |A will seek to reduce H b (P ) for the context p by moving towards either of the basis states {|0 p , |1 p }. Referring to figure 1(a) , we can rewrite the binary entropy (7) for our agent within the context p as
where θ is the angle between the |1 p basis state and the state of the agent |A . Rewriting (7) in this manner makes obvious the way in which the entropy of the agent will change if either (a) the agent undergoes a change in state, or (b) finds themselves in a changed context. However, we are yet to propose the manner in which the social context of our agent might emerge. In what follows we will define the social context of the system as an emergent construct, arising from the combined attitudes of every agent in the model. There are many potential choices for how such a combination might occur. In what follows, we shall discuss one particular implementation, cautioning the reader that many choices are possible, often dependent upon the social system that it is the purpose of the model to describe. The model presented here is intended to be a generic proof of concept, but future work will seek to apply it more specifically to particular social scenarios.
Agents and Contexts Evolving In Time
In time, agents will update their state, and this will affect the society, so changing the social context of all agents. In this section we shall introduce a two stage update strategy consisting of an update of all agent states according to their social contexts, followed by a reconfiguration of the relevant social contexts. In order to pursue this update strategy we shall first have to make the idea of a social context more mathematically specific.
An Entropy-Minimising Global Social Context
Perhaps the most mathematically straightforward option for a social context is a globally defined basis, termed a global frame hereon. This is somewhat plausible from a social modelling perspective, as there are many scenarios where human subjects attempt to conform to the observations and attitudes of others, even when they are obviously wrong [3] . Recalling the preference of agents away from a state of uncertainty, an immediate choice for suh a global social context would be one that minimises the uncertainty of as many agents as possible. The entropy of this frame would be given by the summed binary entropy of all N agents:
which we propose should minimise over time according to the social make up of the system. Thus, if a society is composed of a large number of individuals who have a conformist make-up then intuitively we would expect this entropy function to decrease over time as they all seek to align with the opinions of each other. We shall return to this point in section 6.5, once the full system has been specified. However, it is still possible to develop a quick intuitive understanding of how (10) will work for this system. Somewhat tellingly for this simple case, an absolute minimum of (10) is possible for any situation where all agents are polarised onto the relevant basis states. That is, if all agents are 'decided' (either to act or not to act) then the total binary entropy of the system will be a minimum. However, this completely aligned global understanding of a problem seems quite implausible from a psychological perspective. Frequently, it is possible for the members of a society to understand a problem very differently, or to frame it in a number of different ways [8, 16] , and this will contribute to the social context of all agents. Indeed, it is frequently the case that a society understands an issue from a small number of broadly definable perspectives (e.g. capitalism vs socialism, or pro-green vs pro-development etc.), and so it seems likely that more than one global frame may exist in a society at any one time. We expect that for every issue that a society considers, a set of global frames is likely to emerge spontaneously. Agents would then align their understanding of an issue with a particular global frame, and make their choices on this basis. In order to develop this idea we shall require an additional concept, that of a local frame for each agent in the system.
Local Contexts
A local context represents each agent's individual framing of the situation currently under consideration by the society. This might depend upon a wide range of both external and internal factors, such as their socioeconomic status, educational background, race etc. and so is a highly complex, and multidependent variable, however, as a first approximation, we shall model it as another basis in the two dimensional vector space already introduced for the states and global frame. Our model considers the orientation of each agent's local frame as resulting from an attempt to navigate two different drives for cognitive consistency:
(1) A desire for internal cognitive consistency. This results in a drive to minimise the binary entropy that applies to their decisions through a choice of local frame that results in their current state being maximally decided. (2) A desire to 'fit in' with the society and its current norms. This desire is expressed by a pull of their local frame towards the current global frame to which they belong.
These two drives may prove to compete with one another in the mind of the agent, and indeed, they might have a different pull for agents of different personality types (e.g. a 'conformist' agent vs a highly 'individualistic' one). Defining Θ as the angle between the agent's current state |A and the decision to act in the global context to which they currently belong (defined here as the closest global axis to their current state, see section 7.1), and taking θ to perform a similar function in their local frame, we define each agent's individual entropy, with reference to both frames, as:
where the weights w i (A) and w s (A) refer to agent A's need for internal consistency and social conformity respectively. These weights can be set to range over a population of agents, indicating a rough parameterisation of a societies social make-up. We note that neither of the two terms in (11) are guaranteed to minimise; each agent will have to balance their desire to fit in with their preference for internal cognitive consistency, and how they choose to achieve this will depend upon their personality type (as defined by the weights). We hypothesise that this will result in a situation where a society of agents, guided by their desire for cognitive consistency (both internal and external) will start to generate a set of ideologies in a process of self-organisation.
A Decision in Context
Agents can make decisions within either the local or the global context. This is taken to represent the manner in which, while we frequently make internal or private decisions (as represented by the local frame), we can just as easily cast our choices within a societal domain (as represented by the global frame). Thus, in the simple model, when agents act they will probabilistically choose whether they are making this decision in their local frame, or the global frame of the society (in a wighting that depends upon their personality type). The probability of them choosing whether or not to act in that frame will then be found with reference to probabilites such as (3) (see also Fig. 1(b) ).
An Evolving Agent State
An agent who has chosen to act in a certain context will feel a certain amount of cognitive dissonance, meaning that their decision will not reflect their perceived internal state, and this will result in psychological discomfort [12] . This gives people a drive to either alter their existing cognitions, or to alter their interpretation of a situation, through a re-orientation of their local frame. We note that since an agent has no direct control over the global frame they may not always be able to minimise their uncertainty as represented by (11), however, depending upon their personality type, they may be able to reduce it over time if the global frame is relatively stable.
The model represents the change in an agent's current state |A by shifting it towards the axis representing the their decision by a certain amount. The size of this shift will depend upon their personality variables (w i and w s ), and upon the angle θ between their state at time t, |A t , and the current frame in which they are making their decision as represented by context p, {|0 p , |1 p }. Writing θ 0 for the angle between the agent's state and the |0 p axis, and θ 1 for the angle between their state and the |1 p axis, the new angle between the agent's state and the relevant frame will become:
or if A decides not to act:
where w(A) depends upon the comfort of A with holding two dissonant attitudes. If A's decision is being made in a global frame then w(A) = w s (A), whereas if it is being made in their local frame then w(A) = w i (A). Agents who decide to act will thus rotate by a certain distance towards the |1 p axis (recall that θ is the distance between the |1 p axis and the current state of the agent |A ), and agents who decide not to act will rotate in the opposite direction. Thus, in this model, agents who are comfortable with dissonance will likely be able to maintain attitudes that do not conform to their actions, while those who prefer a consistent cognitive state will experience significant swings in attitude as a result of actions that they choose to take. Over time, agents will change their state in an attempt to gain the cognitive consistency that their personality mandates. This has the effect of in turn changing the social context of all agents, as the global frames that attempt to minimise (10) will constantly have to update to represent the new combined state of their members. Thus, the global frames will shift in response to the new local frames and states of all agents in the system, in a manner that is dependent upon how these frames are specified at implementation.
At this point, we can point to the potential for a system of this nature to be guided towards a desired solution. Since equation (11) has a global term for every agent, global frames can have a disproportionate effect upon the time evolution of the agents in the system. Indeed, a timely introduction of a new global frame that was well oriented with respect to the agents in the system might lead to the emergence of a new paradigm or ideology within the system. We shall return to this point in section 8.
Entropy Minimisation Over Time
Over time, we expect the agents to self-organize towards a scenario where they are highly aligned within groups. This process will be measured by the total entropy of the system, given by a summation of each agent's individual entropy (11) 
The next section will describe a simple implementation of this model, and its dynamics over time. In particular, we shall use (14) to investigate the behaviour of the system, as its agents attempt to navigate the frequently conflicting demands of social cohension and internal consistency.
Implementation and Preliminary Results
A proof of concept model has been implemented in MATLAB, which allows for an investigation of the timewise behaviour of this new agent based modelling paradigm. In section 7.1 we discuss implementation specific choices that were made, before moving onto a discussion in section 7.2 of the results that have been obtained from this very simple model. Section 9 will discuss a number of obvious lines of investigation that have been opened up by this simple model, and discuss plans for future more complex implementations.
Implementation
Implementing the model described in section 6 requires a number of specific choices that are not essential to the model, and could be changed in future. This section highlights those not mentioned in the above section, with the intention of assisting any wishing to emulate this model for themselves. Firstly, the problem of finding global frames is non-trivial. We have chosen clustering for the purposes of this paper, but this choice will no doubt depend upon the specifics of the system to be modelled in future. For this paper, a vertex substitution heuristic (VSH) algorithm was used [32] , in which the distance between frames is represented by the angle between them.
The dimensionality of the system that has been implemented is of the lowest possible form. Thus, it is implemented on a single 2 dimensional plane, with all frames and states being represented on that plane. There is no reason beyond simplicity for this choice. Indeed, there is every reason to expect that attitudes should be represented on a much higher dimensional space, and this will be investigated in the future. However, this choice does allow for a simplification when it comes to defining the closest angle between the axis of a frame and the state of an agent, as well as allowing a straightforward visualisation of the system. This simple model is obviously symmetric. Thus, agents who are at precisely 180
• to one another will exhibit the same probabilities of action in the one global frame. While it might be suggested that the implementation should have been performed upon the semicircle alone, we have kept the implementation on the circle in this work for the sake of the future generality of the model in higher dimensional (and particularly complex number based) implementions. In general quantum theories these two states are not the same, and this can result in important interference effects. This possibility is discussed in section 9. Finally, we note that the choice of personality distribution for a society of agents has a profound influence upon the dynamics of that society. When a random distribution was chosen, the resultant behaviour was most difficult to predict, however, the current implementation allows for changing the distribution of social conformists (w s (A) > w i (A)) to internal coherentists (w i (A) > w s (A)) in the society, and hence the dynamics.
Results
Throughout this section, we shall utilise the following convention in all figures shown: states are represented using black lines, local frames using red lines, and global frames by the large red dots. All figures are presented for the full range of 360
• , despite the symmetry discussed above in section 7.1. This means that when considering the likely actions of an agent (and in particular their clustering in order to obtain a global frame) consideration must be given to the fact that agents drawn directly across the plane have the same probability of acting in any frame drawn for them. Fig. 4 . Two typical time evolution patterns for a system of 100 agents over t=100 iterations, and their associated total entropy signature (obtained with reference to (14) ). Agent states are represented by the long black lines, their local frames as the short red lines, and the global frames as the large red dots at mid-length. Note that in both scenarios the total entropy of the system undergoes a dramatic decrease through time as agents align both their states and their local frames with the two global frames. Fig. 4 depicts two typical runs of the implemented model, for nine time points using 100 agents, where 2 clusters were used to specify 2 global frames. Additionally, a random configuration of agent personality types was chosen for this model. In both (a) and (b) we see that initially all agents are randomly distributed throughout all available attitudes, but that they quickly settle down to a scenario where many agents are clustered around the global frames. This basic structure persists for the remainder of the run, although the situation remains fluid, with all frames and agents evolving substantially over the remainder of the simulation. The evolution of the total entropy (11) is also depicted for both runs. This behaviour is quite standard, however, scenarios where global frames become unstable due to the evolution of agent states and local frames, can arise. It is interesting to note that this pattern of general significant entropy decrease appears to be ubiquitous throughout the model at present for all cases but k = 1. Fig. 5 shows 3 typical entropy signatures, for the case of personality variables assigned for 3 ( Fig. 5(a-c) ), and then 5 ( Fig. 5(d-f) ) global frames. In stark contrast, Fig 6 shows both some time evolution behaviour, as well as the associated entopy signatures found for the case of one global frame (k = 1). We suspect that this effect onl although less stable y arises for the case of one cluster due to the low dimensionality of the current implementation; there are many places where one cluster can be stable, however the options quickly diminish for higher numbers of global frames. Future higher dimensional implementations will test the validity of We shall now turn to a discussion of whether this system can be thought of as undergoing a self-organising process, and to a consideration of whether it might be possible to extract any lessons as to how such a system might be guided by a protagonist interested in shifting the attitudes of a population.
The Guided Self-Organisation of Ideologies
It is interesting to analyse the role of the global frames, and their relation to the local frames, within the framework of complex system science. The global frames can Fig. 7 . Guided Self-Organisation example. Time evolution patterns for a system of 100 agents all characterised by the same personality values (consistency and conformity =.5). After 50 iterations the system reaches a stable state with 2 global frames and all agents aligned to their local frames as well as to one of the global frame. At iteration 51 an external perturbation rotates one of the global frames of 30 degrees clockwise. At iteration 55 and 60 we see the system re-organising. After 100 iterations the system reaches a new, different stable state. The rightmost panel shows the time evolution of the total entropy measure, clearly displaying the effect of the intervention at iteration 51.
be identified as 'emergent structures' according to several definitions. Besides their trivial identification in terms of pattern formation, the global frames are example of intrinsic emergence [13] in the sense that they provide information processing for the agents that the system consists of. Notice that in our model there is no communication among agents; agents understand what other agents do and what the shared understanding of the problem is only via the global frames, which become the avenue for internal information processing. Without the global frames, no internal organization would be possible. The global frames can be identified as 'emergent structures' also according to the Efficiency of Prediction view of emergence [30] . According to this view, the global frames identify the level of analysis at which it is most efficient to describe the system; if we want to understand the societal perception of a problem, we could analyse all individual local frames and agent states of it, at a considerable processing cost, or we could reach a similar understanding by just analysing the global frames, that is the shared ideologies of the agents in the system. This understanding would quite possibly miss many subtleties, but it would also come at a considerably reduced computation cost.
As a more stringent requirement, emergent structures may be required to display some sort of independent causal power, that is some causal power which does not reduce to the components that the emergent structure is made of [6] . In our model, this causal power is represented by the influence of the global frames upon each agents state and local frame; there is an obvious feedback loop between the local frames which, via the clustering algorithm, determines the global frames, and the global frames which, once identified, influence the local frames and the agents states by affecting their position as a function of the agents action and personality (a similar feedback loop occurs between local frames and agents states).
It is this causal power which provides an avenue for intervention in the system via the global frames. Figure 7 (a) shows a system after 50 iterations, in which each agent has a value of .5 for both consistency and conformity. This parameterization was chosen because it leads to a full collapse of agent states and frames on the global frames and simplifies the following analysis (a similar, although less stable, phenomenon is seen with the random initialization of agent personalities -see figure 4 ). At iteration 50 the system has reached an apparently stable state. At iteration 51 we perturb one of the frames by imposing a rotation. This may be seen as an external intervention to redefine what an ideology represents; it could be a party redefining its values, or new information that redefines a currently held position on an issue. Figures 7(b,c) show the system responding to the perturbation and trying to reorganize itself. Figure 7 (d) shows the system converging to a final stable state, which differs from the intervention free one (Figure 7(a) ). Finally figure 7(e) shows the associated total entropy signature, clearly highlighting the intervention point with a surge in global entropy which then settles down to the new stable state. By slightly paraphrasing the definition of self-organization given in [26] , figure 7 provides an example of the self-organised nature of the system as well as an avenue for guiding the process. Reinterpreting equations (29) and (30) from that paper, we can see that a considerable re-organization in the system (a re-organization which involves considerable information processing by all agents in the system) has been obtained by a single external action. This action involves a much reduced information processing effort than what would be required was the system not organized, in which case the same action would have had to be carried out on each agent subscribing to the perturbed ideology. In other words, rather than having to convince several tens of agents, all was needed was to change the ideology they subscribe to. Naturally, this provides an avenue for guiding the system towards desirable final configurations.
Future Directions
An obvious set of possibilities for extension in this model will all require more realistic social modelling. Firstly, a spatial implementation, where conformity can only be satisfied over a defined semi-local network seems desirable. At the moment conformists strive to reach a scenario where they agree with all agents in their relevant global frame. Future implementations will seek to provide the model with a social network style dependency for this agreement. Thus, in this model, social clades or subgroups could spontaneously emerge with a well defined spatial (or communication based) boundary; who you talk to matters in the social world. Additionally, it is likely that people make decisions with respect to their local frame far more frequently than they do with respect to global ones that they might find themselves in (e.g. we likely judge people without expressing these judgements far more often than we make explicit our judgements or actions in a community setting). Hence, this is an obvious variable for future investigation. In a similar vein, the use of a single plane for the current model places a highly unrealistic assumption upon the nature of social attitude formation and change. A higher dimensional model that incorporates the numerous results from social psychology about underlying attitude and opinion variables is another obvious candidate for extension.
Another set of possibilities arise from the quantum inspired nature of this model. Indeed, a highly developed set of quantum inspired models of human decision making are coming to the fore, all of which utilise marked interference effects to explain the apparent inconsistencies violations of standard probability theory that are exhibited by humans every day as we make decisions in a complex world [9, 34, 20] . These models all seek to explain the decisions of a single human agent, and it has been the purpose of this paper to present a model that 'scales them up' into a social context, however, we have refrained from a consideration of within agent interference in this model, and this intriguing possibility also presents a ripe opportunity for investigation.
Indeed, we feel that with the more realistic enhancements described above, this model might be capable of shedding genuine light upon the complex dynamics of social evolution and re-adjustment. Ultimately, we believe that a more realistic future extension of this model could be used to predict how likely a society is to undergo such phenomena as attitudinal phase transitions, or re-framings of issues and debates. Thus, policy makers could track the evolution in a society and adduce when such scenarios were entering phases of instability where the likely hijacking of opinions and attitudes by interested parties was becoming a significant possibility. Needless to say, the applications of such tools in a commercial domain would be highly desirable, and so care must be taken in designing a theory of this form. Regardless of this potential downside, we feel that the beneficial applications of this genuinely new agent based model make future more realistic extensions of it highly desirable.
Conclusions
This paper has presented a model of human decision making that is based upon the highly complex notion of an attitude. Social psychology has developed a rich set of empirical results that shed light upon this concept, however, many of the more mathematical models of attitude change are naive, relying upon objective states and properties which suggest that attitudes are held regardless of the context in which humans find themselves. This is a problematic assumption, as humans are cognitive misers [15] , and our opinions are apt to change in response to many contextual factors; frequently our minds are only 'made up' at the point where we are forced to make a choice. The model presented here attempts to approach the problem of modelling social decision making from this perspective.
We have presented the a notion of an agent, who, while they possess a cognitive state or attitude |A , may make very different decisions depending upon the context in which they find themselves. This is represented probabilistically, using a geometric approach to uncertainty which captures this notion of a decision in context. We then showed how a process of uncertainty reduction can be related to the drive of individuals to minimise the cognitive dissonance that they experience when holding an attitude that differs from their actions. This was in turn used to motivate a model of the state update of agents over time, with different members of the population subjected to different update regimes depending upon how uncomfortable they are with internal inconsistency and social non-conformity. We argued that this update will in turn result in the emergence of ideologies in a society, resultant from a process of self-organisation.
More generally, beyond the likely advantages of a genuinely new approach, we believe that our model provides an unlikely avenue of communication between natural scientists and engineers on one side and social scientists on the other. Effective communication between these groups is often often lost in this arena, insurmountably challenged by a crucial difference in their divergent approaches to knowledge; while natural scientists and engineers are trained to think that there is a truth which needs to be discovered, social scientists tend to believe truth is a metal construct and thus contextual. In the first case uncertainty arises from not knowing the truth (knowing too little), in the second about choosing which truth to accept (knowing too differently), an understanding that at first glance appears not amenable to rigorous formal analysis, and is often refuted by natural scientists for this reason alone. We believe that the geometric representation employed in this paper allows natural scientists and engineers to model, and thus more easily accept, the views that social scientists hold so dear. Similarly, the adoption of our proposed framework may in some cases provide social scientists with some confidence that important aspects of social theory can be considered within quantitative models, so making them to relevant to the real world problems that they are seeking to address.
Overall, we feel that this proposed new class of model offers a promising avenue for future research. It allows for the sophisticated modeling of humans working within the many frames and contexts that affect their decisions and choices. Such models are likely to prove essential for including the actual dynamics of human deccision making in the complex and often contradictory world that we inhabit as a society, and so an honest exploration of their possibilities could open up a new frontier of mathematical and computational analysis. This alone makes them worthy of attention.
